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Abstract—To be successful in multi-player drone racing, a
player must not only follow the race track in an optimal way,
but also compete with other drones through strategic blocking,
faking, and opportunistic passing while avoiding collisions. Since
unveiling one’s own strategy to the adversaries is not desirable,
this requires each player to independently predict the other
players’ future actions. Nash equilibria are a powerful tool to
model this and similar multi-agent coordination problems in
which the absence of communication impedes full coordination
between the agents. In this paper, we propose a novel receding
horizon planning algorithm that, exploiting sensitivity analysis
within an iterated best response computational scheme, can
approximate Nash equilibria in real time. We also describe a
vision-based pipeline that allows each player to estimate its
opponent’s relative position. We demonstrate that our solution
effectively competes against alternative strategies in a large
number of drone racing simulations. Hardware experiments with
onboard vision sensing prove the practicality of our strategy.
I. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Video of the experiments: https://youtu.be/cJW1RysDKDg.
II. INTRODUCTION
Drone racing has recently become a popular sport with
international competitions being held regularly and attracting
a growing public [1]. In these races, human pilots directly
control the UAVs through a radio transmitter while receiving a
first-person-view live stream from an onboard camera. Human
racers need years of training to master the advanced navigation
and control skills that are required to be successful in this
sport. Many of these skills would certainly prove useful for
a robot to safely and quickly move through a cluttered envi-
ronment in, for example, a disaster response scenario. For this
reason, drone racing has attracted a significant interest from
the scientific community, which led to the first autonomous
drone racing competition being held during the IROS 2016
international conference [2].
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Figure 1: Drone racing experiment.
Most of the past research has focused on a time trial style
of racing: a single robot must complete a racing track in the
shortest amount of time. This scenario poses a number of chal-
lenges in terms of dynamic modeling, on-board perception,
localization and mapping, trajectory generation and optimal
control. Impressive results have been obtained in this context
not only for autonomous UAVs [3], but also for a variety of
different platforms, such as cars [4]–[6] motorcycles [7], and
even sailboats [8].
Much less attention, on the other hand, has been devoted to
the more classical multi-player style of racing that we address
in this paper, sometimes called rotocross among drone racing
enthusiasts. In addition to the aforementioned challenges, this
kind of race also requires direct competition with other agents,
incorporating strategic blocking, faking, and opportunistic
passing while avoiding collisions. Multi-player drone racing
is then also a good testing ground for developing and testing
more widely applicable non-cooperative multi-robot planning
strategies.
Once the robots leave the protected and isolated environ-
ment of a factory floor, it becomes crucial for them to be able
to safely and effectively interact with other robots and, perhaps
more importantly, with human beings. In particular, they must
avoid collisions that could compromise their functioning or
cause injuries to humans. In some cases, safety can be ensured
by designing specific (and common) policies for the agents or
by relying on communication. In a drone race, however, it
would not be reasonable to impose a common control policy
to all players or even to require players to unveil their future
actions to the opponents. Another example, in this context, is
autonomous driving in presence of human-driven cars. Indeed,
assuming complex human-robot communication, beyond some
basic form of signaling, is not realistic.
In order to guarantee safety in absence of communication,
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robots must be able to predict what the other robotic/human
agents will do and act consequently. To guarantee performance
and robustness, the models employed for such predictions
must also consider the reactive behavior of other agents to
the robots own actions induced, for example, by reciprocal
collision avoidance constraints.
In this paper, we consider two-player autonomous drone
racing as a practical application to develop effective strategies
for scenarios involving multiple rational agents that: i) do not
communicate their policies to each other, ii) know each other’s
goals and constraints, iii) behave reactively in order to avoid
collisions with other agents. We believe that game theory [9]
is the most appropriate tool to model scenarios such as these.
Motivated by the success obtained by Model Predictive
Control (MPC) in the development of real-time optimal control
schemes, we apply similar receding horizon control strategies
in the context of multi-player drone racing. Differently from
a standard MPC planner, however, our strategy also takes into
account other agents reactions to the ego agent actions. We
achieve this by employing an iterated best response com-
putation scheme: each player alternatively solves an optimal
control problem for each player while keeping the other
player’s strategy constant. In addition to this, in order to
fully capture and exploit the effects of the collision avoidance
constraints, we also use sensitivity analysis to approximate the
effects of one player’s actions on its opponent’s cost.
Despite the fact that Nash equilibria are often difficult to
achieve or verify in dynamic games, we prove that, if our
algorithm converges, the output satisfies necessary conditions
for a Nash equilibrium. In practice, we find that the algorithm
does converge, providing a theoretical foundation for our
technique. The algorithm also runs in real time, at 20Hz, on
standard hardware.
This work focuses on the competition and interaction be-
tween the drones, not on the perception and navigation of
the race course or environment. Hence, we assume that each
drone has a prior map of the race course, and has access to
its own position (e.g. with GPS or an external motion capture
system). However, each drone estimates the relative position
of its competitor with an on board monocular camera.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in a large
number of simulations in which our planner competes against
multiple alternative strategies. We also prove the applicability
of our method in hardware experiments with two quadrotor
robots racing on an indoor circular course.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, in
Sect. III, we review some of the existing relevant literature.
Then, in Sect. IV, we model the drone racing problem
and introduce the associated sensing and control constraints.
Subsequently, in Sect. V, we formulate the position control
problem as a Nash equilibrium search and we detail the
numerical methods used to obtain real time solutions. We then
describe our orientation control strategy. Then, in Sect. VI, we
provide details on the algorithms used for estimating both the
ego robot and the opponent positions. In Sect. VII we report
simulation and experimental results obtained by letting our
method compete against alternative ones. Finally, in Sect. VIII,
we conclude the paper and outline future extensions.
III. PREVIOUS WORKS
In this section, we give a brief overview of some of the
literature relevant to this work first in the context of single-
robot motion planning, then in the multi-robot setting. We
discuss both classical approaches and more recent results. In
particular, we focus our attention on approaches exploiting
results from game theory using either a Stackelberg or a Nash
information patterns, which are more closely related to our
work.
A. Single-robot planning
A number of effective solutions for motion planning in
presence of both static and dynamic obstacles have been pro-
posed in the past. Some classical works use artificial potential
fields [10], [11], geometric approaches [12] or sampling-based
methods [13], [14]. More recently, also thanks to the availabil-
ity of efficient numerical optimization schemes, a number of
Model Predictive Control (MPC) and Reinforcement Learning
(RL) approaches have also been proposed [5], [6], [15]. More
specifically to our application, the authors of [3] ranked first in
the IROS 2016 drone racing competition exploiting an optical
flow sensor and a direct visual servoing control scheme.
Most of these works rely on simple “open-loop” models
to predict the obstacle motion. In many situations, however,
obstacles behave in a reactive way. A human, for example, will
in turn actively avoid collision with the controlled robot and,
thus, her/his motion will be strongly affected by that of the
robot. This reactiveness creates a “loop closure” which, if not
properly managed, can induce oscillatory effects sometimes
referred to as reciprocal dances [16].
B. Cooperative multi-robot control
Impressive results have been obtained by relying on commu-
nication to coordinate multiple robots in a navigation context
or, more in general, to realize a common task [17], [18].
In other cases, communication is achieved more implicitly
by an exchange of forces [19]. Some works remove the
communication layer but rely on a common (or at least known)
set of motion policies to achieve cooperation among multiple
agents [12], [20]–[23].
C. Game theoretic control using a Stackelberg information
pattern
While broadly used in economics and social science, game
theory has not yet attracted, in our opinion, a sufficient interest
from the robotics community, mostly due to the computational
complexity typically associated with these methods.
Some interesting results have been obtained applying game
theoretic concepts to robust H∞ optimal control design
(see [24] for a recent review on the topic). The disturbance
acting on a system can be modeled as an antagonistic agent
that explicitly aims at minimizing the system performance thus
giving rise to a zero-sum differential game [9]. Similar models
have also been employed to calculate the so called reachable
set of a system: the set of states from which there exists at
least one disturbance that brings the system to a dangerous
state [25]. Finding the reachable sets usually requires the in-
tegration of the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) partial
differential equations. Apart from simple cases, the computa-
tional complexity of these methods often limits their use to
offline implementations. Real-time solutions can be obtained,
in some cases, by leveraging suitable approximations [26].
More recently, similar approaches have also been employed
in the context of autonomous driving. In [27], for example, the
interaction between an autonomous car and a human driven
one is modeled as a Stackelberg game: the human is assumed
to know in advance what the autonomous car will do and to
respond optimally according to an internal cost function. This
results in a nested optimization problem that can be exploited
to control the human motion [28] or to reconstruct the cost
function driving his/her actions [27].
D. Game theoretic control using a Nash information pattern
Giving the other players some information advantage can,
in general, improve the robustness of the system. However,
in many applications such as drone racing and autonomous
driving, no agent would have any information advantage with
respect to the others. For this reason, we believe that Stackel-
berg information models could result in overly conservative
actions. A more realistic model is that of Nash equilibria
which, instead, assume a fully symmetric information pattern.
A very recent paper [29] proposes a control algorithm for
coordinating the motion of multiple cars through an inter-
section exploiting generalized Nash equilibria. The numerical
resolution is in the order of several seconds which is close to
real time but still not sufficient for the approach to be used
for online control.
In the context of car racing, the authors of [30] investigate
both Stackelberg and Nash equilibria. Computational perfor-
mance close to real time, however, can only be obtained in a
simplified scenario in which only one of the two players avoids
collisions. In addition to this, the authors also discuss the
importance of exploiting blocking behaviors. However, while
in our work these behaviors naturally emerge from the use
of sensitivity analysis, in [30] these are hardcoded in the cost
function optimized by the players.
The main limiting factor for applying game theory more
widely to robotic control problems seems to lie in the asso-
ciated computational complexity. We believe, however, that
game theory can still be used as an inspiration for guiding
the design of effective and computationally efficient heuristics.
This paper is a first step in this direction.
IV. PRELIMINARIES
Consider two quadrotor UAVs competing against each other
in a drone racing scenario. In order to simplify the high level
control strategy, we will assume that the robots fly at a constant
altitude with simplified holonomic dynamics given by[
p˙i
ψ˙i
]
=
[
Ri 0
02 1
] [
vi
ωi
]
, (1)
where pi ∈ R2 is the robot horizontal position in the world
frame, Ri = Rz(ψi) ∈ R2×2 represents the rotation matrix
τ wτ
pi
τ i
ni
ti
Figure 2: Representation of the race track used for the sim-
ulations. The track is parameterized by its center line τ and
its half width wτ . Given the current robot position pi, we can
define a local track frame with origin τ i as the closest point
to pi and with t and n being the local tangent and normal
vectors to the track in τ i.
associated to the robot yaw ψi ∈ S1, and vi ∈ R2 and ωi ∈ R
are the body-frame linear velocity and angular rates, which are
assumed to be known and controllable. Given (1), the robot
state is xi = (pi, ψi) ∈ R2 × S1 and it is assumed locally
available, e.g. using onboard GPS and compass sensors.
Due to limitations of onboard actuators, the robots linear
velocities are limited, i.e.
‖vi‖ = ‖p˙i‖ ≤ vi ∈ R+.
The race track center line is defined by a twice continuously
differentiable immersed plane closed curve τ (see Fig. 2). For
such a curve, there exists an arch-length parameterization
τ : [0, lτ ] 7→ R2, with τ (0) = τ (lτ )
where lτ is the total length of the track. Moreover, one can
also define a local signed curvature κ and unit tangent and
normal vectors (t and n respectively) as follows
t = τ ′ (2)
nκ = τ ′′. (3)
To remain within the boundaries of the track, the robot’s
distance from the track center line must be smaller than the
(constant) track width wτ ∈ R+, i.e.∣∣n(si)T [pi − τ (si)]∣∣ ≤ wτ
where si ∈ [0, lτ ] is the robot position along the track, i.e. the
arch length of the point on the track that is closest to pi
si(pi) = arg min
s
1
2 ‖τ (s)− pi‖2. (4)
In order to avoid potential collisions, each robot always
maintains a minimum distance di ∈ R+ with respect to its
opponent, i.e. ∥∥pi − pj∥∥ ≥ di. (5)
Note that here, as well as in the rest of the paper, we always
use i (= 1 or 2) to refer to a generic robot and j (= 2 or 1
respectively) to refer to its opponent.
Each UAV is also equipped with an onboard calibrated
monocular camera that can detect and track a spherical marker
attached to the opponent body, provided that this latter is in the
camera field of view. Assuming that the radius of the spherical
target is known, they can retrieve the relative position of the
opponent expressed in their local body-frame, i.e.
pij = R
T
i
(
pj − pi
)
. (6)
Fusing (6) with their ego state estimate, each robot can then
estimate the world frame position of its opponent.
Since the robot cameras have a limited field of view, we
need to impose a visibility constraint for measurement (6) to
be available. We assume that the size of the spherical markers
mounted on the robots is such that, even when the two robots
are at a minimum distance di from each other, a robot marker
is entirely visible by its opponent camera, provided that the
following condition is satisfied:
pTij∥∥pij∥∥e1 := βTije1 ≥ cos(α) (7)
where βij is a relative bearing vector, α is the camera field
of view and e1 = (1, 0) is the optical axis which is assumed,
without loss of generality, to be aligned with the x-axis of the
robot body frame.
Since we exploit a receding horizon control approach, the
objective for each robot is to have a more advanced position
along the track, with respect to the opponent, at the end of the
planning horizon T . The final position is given by:
di = Nilτ + si(pi(t+ T ))
where Ni is the number of completed track loops and si is
computed as in (4). Neglecting the constant terms, the objec-
tive function of player i is then to maximize the difference
fi = si(pi(t+ T ))− sj(pj(t+ T )). (8)
Because of the collision avoidance constraints (5), in order
to calculate its optimal trajectory, each robot needs access
to its opponent’s strategy. However, since the robots are
competing against each other, we do not expect them to
share/communicate their plans. Instead, each robot needs to
model the opponent and predict its actions. We believe that
game theory [9] is the correct framework to describe this non-
cooperative scenario. In particular, drone racing can be seen
as a zero-sum differential game because clearly from (8) one
has f1 + f2 = 0.
Since the cost function (8) only depends on the robots’
positions and the constraints on the robot positions and yaw
angles can be separated, we perform the planning for the
robots’ position and yaw angles separately: first we apply a
game theoretic approach to calculate optimal control inputs
for the translational part of the robot dynamics; then we
calculate the yaw angle control in such a way that the
visibility constraints (7) remain satisfied at all times given the
planned/expected translational motions.
V. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION
In this section we address the planning problem for the
translational component of the robot state, i.e. the first row
of (1). Since the robots know their relative positions and their
state with respect to the world frame, we can rewrite the
optimization problem in world frame coordinates. By doing
this, the robots dynamics further simplify to p˙i = ui. We also
note that, since the second term in (8) does not depend on
player i’s actions, this can be neglected without changing the
set of optimal solutions for player i.
To make the problem tractable, we discretize the planning
horizon and we assume piecewise constant control inputs for
both players, i.e. ui(t) = uki /δt = const ∀t ∈ [t0, t0 + kδt)
where δt is a constant sampling interval. Defining θi =
(p1i , . . . , p
N
i ,u
1
i , . . . ,u
N
i ) and ui = viδt, the problem can
then be rewritten as
max
θi
si(p
N
i ) (9a)
s.t. pki = p
k−1
i + u
k
i (9b)∥∥pkj − pki ∥∥ ≥ di (9c)∣∣∣n(pki )T [pki − τ (pki )]∣∣∣ ≤ wτ (9d)∥∥uki ∥∥ ≤ ui. (9e)
For simplicity of notation let us rewrite problem (9) in a
more compact and general form
max
θi
si(θi) (10a)
s.t. hi(θi) = 0 (10b)
gi(θi) ≤ 0 (10c)
γi(θi,θj) ≤ 0 (10d)
where:
• hi represents the equality constraints (9b) involving a
single player;
• gi represents the inequality constraints (9d) and (9e)
involving a single player;
• γi represents the inequality constraints (9c) involving
both players.
Let us also define Θi ⊆ R4N as the space of admissible
strategies for player i, i.e. strategies that satisfy (10b) to (10d).
Note that, due to (9c), one has Θi = Θi(θj), i.e. the strategy
of one player determines the set of admissible strategies of
its opponent and, as a consequence, can influence this latter’s
behavior.
In a game, the concept of an optimal solution loses meaning
because, in general, and especially in a zero-sum game, it is
not possible to find a pair of strategies (θ1,θ2) that maximize
the cost function of both agents simultaneously. On the other
hand, various types of equilibria can be defined depending on
the degree of cooperation between the agents and the infor-
mation pattern of the game (see [9] for a complete description
of the possible alternatives). In this work, in particular, we
exploit the concept of Nash equilibria, which, by modeling a
perfectly symmetric information pattern, do not induce overly
optimistic or conservative behaviors.
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (θ∗1,θ
∗
2) ∈ Θ1×Θ2
such that no player can improve its own outcome by unilater-
ally changing its own strategy, i.e.
θ∗i = arg max
θi∈Θi(θ∗j )
si(θi) (11)
An alternative definition of Nash equilibria can be given by
defining a best reply map
Ri(θj) = {θi ∈ Θi(θj) : si(θi) = s∗i (θj)}
where
s∗i (θj) = max
θi∈Θi(θj)
si(θi) (12)
is player i’s best-response return to player j’s strategy θj . One
can show that a Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of the best
reply map, i.e. such that θ∗i ∈ Ri(θ∗j ).
Unfortunately, since problem (9) is not convex due to (9c),
in general multiple Nash equilibria may exist (e.g. left vs
right side overtaking). Additionally, computing the exact value
of some Nash equilibrium, generally requires numerical algo-
rithms whose computational complexity makes them still not
well suited for online robot control. Therefore, the next section
describes an iterative algorithm that allows to approximate
Nash equilibria in real time.
A. Numerical resolution of Nash equilibria
In order to approximate Nash equilibria in real time, we
use an iterated best response algorithm (IBR). Starting from
an initial guess of the Nash equilibrium strategy profile, we
update each player’s strategy, alternatively, to the best-response
to the current opponent’s strategy. This is done by solving a
standard optimization problem in which one player strategy
is allowed to change while the opponent’s one is kept con-
stant. Intuitively, if the resulting sequence of strategy profiles
converges, it follows that each player is best-responding to
its opponent. If this is the case, then no profitable unilateral
change of strategy exists as required by the Nash equilibrium
definition (11).
From our perspective, in the aim of developing a real time
planner, IBR has the advantage that one can finely tune how
much each player takes into account the reactivity of its
opponent. By limiting the number of iterations per planning
step, one can cover a spectrum of behaviors ranging from a
very efficient, but naive, classical optimal control problem
(with a fixed guess for the opponent strategy) to a more
computationally expensive but fully game theoretic approach.
Unfortunately, a direct application of IBR to (9) does
not allow to fully capture the implications of the collision
avoidance constraints (9c). As already mentioned, in fact, since
player i has no direct influence over the final position of player
j (i.e. sj), the second term in (8) can be neglected in (9).
However, since player j is calculating its strategy by solving
an optimization problem similar to (9), due to the presence
of the joint constraints (9c), player i does have an effect on
s∗j (θ
∗
i ) (see the counterpart of (12) for player j). In other
words, while player i does not affect player j’s final position
in general, it does affect it at the Nash equilibrium. To capture
these effects, we propose to substitute (10a) with the following
cost function
si(θi)− αs∗j (θi)
where α ≥ 0 is a free parameter.
A closed form expression for s∗j (θi) is hard to obtain.
Inspired by [31], we can, however, exploit sensitivity analysis
to calculate a linear approximation around the current guess
for the Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
Let us assume that, at the l-th iteration, a guess θl−1i
for player i’s strategy is available to player j. Given this
strategy for its opponent, player j can solve the optimal control
problem (9) with θi = θl−1i (fixed). This step will result
in a new best-responding strategy for player j, θlj , with the
associated payoff s∗j (θ
l−1
i ). Assuming player i is now given
the opportunity to modify its own strategy, we are interested
in characterizing the variations of s∗j (θi) for θi in the vicinity
of θl−1i using a first-order Taylor approximation
s∗j (θi) ≈ s∗j (θl−1i ) +
ds∗j
dθi
∣∣∣∣
θl−1i
(θi − θl−1i ). (13)
Exploiting the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) necessary op-
timality conditions associated to player j’s optimal control
problem (10) one can prove the following result.
Lemma 1. If s∗j is the optimal value of an optimization
problem obtained from (10) by exchanging subscripts i and
j, then
ds∗j
dθi
∣∣∣∣
θl−1i
= −µlj
∂γj
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
(θl−1i ,θ
l
j)
(14)
where θlj ∈ Rj(θl−1i ) is the best-response of player j to θl−1i
and µlj is the row vector of Lagrange multipliers associated
to the joint inequality constraints (10d).
Proof. A full discussion on sensitivity analysis can be found
in [32]. A brief proof, specific to the case at hand, is reported
in Appendix A.
Neglecting any term that is constant with respect to θi,
we then propose that the ego vehicle solves the following
optimization problem alternatively for itself and its opponent:
max
θi∈Θli
si(θi) + αµ
l
j
∂γj
∂θi
∣∣∣∣
(θl−1i ,θ
l
j)
θi (15)
where Θli respresents the space of strategies θi that sat-
isfy (10b) to (10d) with θj = θlj .
Theorem 1. If γ1(θ1,θ2) = γ2(θ1,θ2) and the iterations
converge to a solution (θl1,θ
l
2), then the strategy tuple (θ
l
1,θ
l
2)
satisfies the necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the drone racing scenario, in particular, using (4) and (5)
after some straightforward calculation, (15) reduces to
max
θi∈Θli
[
arg min
s
1
2
∥∥τ (s)− pNi ∥∥2 + α N∑
k=1
µk,lj β
k,l
ij
T
pki
]
(16)
where
βk,lij =
pk,lj − pk,l−1i∥∥∥pk,lj − pk,l−1i ∥∥∥ .
To obtain a more intuitive interpretation of this result, let
us assume that the track is linear and aligned to a unit vector
t so that the first term in (16) can be rewritten as tTpNi
(see Sect. V-B for details). Since player i cannot modify
the strategy of player j, the following problem has the same
solutions as (16)
max
θi∈Θli
tTpNi − α
N∑
k=1
µk,lj β
k,l
ij
T
(pk,lj − pki ) (17)
We can then notice the following insightful facts. First of
all, if none of the collision avoidance constraints (9c) were
active in the l-th instance of problem (9), i.e. if µk,lj = 0,
then (17) reduces to (9). This has an intuitive explanation: if
the collision avoidance constraints are not active, the optimal
control problems for the two players are independent of each
other and the original dynamic game reduces to a pair of
classical optimal control problems. Interestingly, in this case,
the only sensible strategy for a player is to advance as much
as possible along the track.
The problem becomes much more interesting when the
collision constraints are active (µk,lj > 0). In this case, indeed,
the cost function optimized in (17) contains additional terms
with respect to (9c). By inspecting these terms, one can easily
notice that they have a positive effect on player i’s reward if
robot i reduces its distance from player j’s predicted position
(pk,lj ) along the direction of β
k,l
ij . The intuition behind this is
that, when the collision avoidance constraints are active, player
i can win the race by either going faster along the track or
by getting in the way of player j, thus obstructing its motion
along the path.
Isolating the last term in the summation, one can also rewrite
the problem as
max
θi∈Θli
(
t+ αµk,Nj β
k,N
ij
)T
pNi + α
N−1∑
k=1
µk,lj β
k,l
ij
T
pki .
From this alternative expression it is clear that, depending
on the value of αµk,Nj , player i might actually find it more
convenient to move its last position in the direction of player
j (βk,Nij ) rather than along the track (t). One can then also
interpret the free scalar gain α as an aggressiveness factor.
Using (9b) one can also substitute pNi = p
n
i +
∑N
k=n+1 u
k
i
and draw similar conclusions for any intermediate position pni .
Note that player i can exploit this effect only so long as
it does not cause a violation of its own collision avoidance
constraint (9c).
Before concluding this section, we want to stress the fact
that, since the players do not communicate with each other,
each of them must independently run the iterative algorithm
described above and alternatively solve the optimization prob-
lem (16) for themselves and for their opponent. In order to
generate control inputs in real time, in our implementation we
do not wait until convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Instead,
we perform a constant number of iterations L, which can
initial guess for 2
solve (16) for 1
solve (16) for 2
l < L
solve (16) for 1
out
l + +
yes
no
initial guess for 1
solve (16) for 2
solve (16) for 1
l < L
solve (16) for 2
out
l + +
yes
no
Figure 3: Flowchart representation of the iterative algorithm
used by the two players to find approximate Nash equilibria.
be set depending on the available computational resources.
Since updating the opponent’s strategy is only useful if this is
exploited for recomputing a player’s own strategy, we conclude
each player’s iterations with an extra resolution of its own
optimal control problem. This also ensures that the resulting
strategy profile satisfies the player’s own constraints.
As for the resolution of each player’s optimal control prob-
lem (16), we use an iterative algorithm described in Sect. V-B.
B. Numerical resolution of players’ optimization
The resolution strategy described in Sect. V-A relies on the
assumption that, at each iteration l, an optimal solution to
problem (16) can be found given the current guess for the
opponent strategy at the equilibrium.
Note that (16) is a well posed problem. Indeed, due to
the system dynamic constraints (9b), the input boundedness
imposed by constraints (9e), and assuming that the sam-
pling time is finite, the set Θli is bounded. On the other
hand Θli is also never empty because the solution θi =
(p0i , . . . ,p
0
i ,02, . . . ,02) is always feasible, assuming that the
robots do not start from a position that violates (9c) and (9d).
Unfortunately, problem (16) is also non-linear and non-
convex and thus we cannot guarantee the uniqueness of an
optimal solution. A source of non-convexity, in particular, is
the reciprocal collision avoidance constraint (9c). For example,
player i can potentially overtake player j by passing on the
left or right side and, in some situations, these two solutions
might even result in an equivalent payoff.
Because of the aforementioned non-convexity, local op-
timization strategies will, in general, result in suboptimal
solutions. In this work, however, we must calculate solutions
to (16) in a very limited amount of time for online control.
We then opt for a local optimization strategy thus potentially
sacrificing optimality for the sake of increasing performance.
Assume that player i is at the l-th iteration of the Nash
equilibrium search. The predicted strategy for player j is then
θlj and it remains fixed while player i is solving problem (16),
again, iteratively. In order to simplify the notation, in this
section we drop the superscript l that indicates the Nash equi-
librium search iteration and, instead, we use the superscript to
indicate the internal iterations used to solve (16). Moreover, to
clarify the notation even further, we use a · accent to indicate
all quantities that remain constant across all inner iterations
used to solve a single instance of (16). Therefore, assume
that player i’s current guess of its optimal strategy is θmi . We
use θmi to compute a convex Quadratically-Constrained Linear
(QCLP) approximation of problem (16).
Constraints (9b) and (9e) can be used as they are because
they are either linear or quadratic and convex. The linear
approximation of (9c) and (9d) is also straightforward and
results in the following constraints
βk,mij
T
(pkj − pki ) ≥ di∣∣∣nk,mi T (pki − τ k,mi )∣∣∣ ≤ wτ ,
with βk,mij =
pkj−pk,mi
‖pkj−pk,mi ‖ , n
k,m
i = n(p
k,m
i ), and τ
k,m
i =
τ (pk,mi ).
The only term that requires some attention is the linear
approximation of the cost function in (15) and, in particular, of
its first term because we do not have a closed form expression
for si as a function of pNi . However, since p
N
i is a constant
parameter in the optimization problem that defines si, we can
exploit sensitivity analysis again to compute the derivative of
si with respect to pNi . To this end, let us rewrite
si = arg min
s
d(s,pNi ),with d(s,p
N
i ) =
1
2
∥∥τ (s)− pNi ∥∥2.
Then, as shown in [32] (and summarized in Appendix C for
the case at hand) the derivative of si with respect to pNi can
be calculated as
dsi
dpNi
= −
(
∂2d
∂s2
)−1
∂2d
∂s∂pNi
=
τ ′
‖τ ′‖2 − (pNi − τ)T τ ′′ .
(18)
Exploiting the arc length parameterization and the relations (2)
and (3) we conclude
dsi
dpNi
=
tT
1− κ(pNi − τ)Tn := σ(pNi )
where t,n and τ must be computed for s = si(pNi ).
Neglecting any term that does not depend on θi, the cost
function can then be approximated around θmi as
σmi p
N
i + α
N∑
k=1
µkjβ
k
ij
T
pki
with σmi = σ(p
N,m
i ).
The solution θm+1i to the approximate QCLP problem can
then used to build a new approximation of problem (16). The
sequential QCLP optimization terminates when either a max-
imum number of iterations has been reached or the difference
between two consecutive solutions, r =
∥∥θm+1i − θmi ∥∥, is
smaller than a given threshold.
C. Alternative control strategies
In order to asses the effectiveness of our approach, in the
experiments of Sect. VII, we let our controller compete with
the following alternative control strategies.
1) Model predictive control (MPC): This strategy is based
on the realistic, but naïve, assumption that player i’s op-
ponent will follow a straight line trajectory at (constant)
maximum linear velocity along the local direction of the
track, i.e. vjt(s(p0j )). Based on this assumption, player i can
predict player j’s strategy and solve (9) as a single classical
optimal control problem. The numerical optimization scheme
described in Sect. V-B can be used also in this case to
efficiently compute a locally optimal solution.
2) Reciprocal velocity obstacles (RVO): This second
benchmark strategy is based on the multi-agent collision
avoidance library proposed in [22] and implemented in the
open-source library RVO21. We approximated the boundaries
of the track with a set of polygonal obstacles. For each robot,
RVO uses a reference linear velocity with maximum norm vi
and direction computed as t(p0i )+ρ(τ (s
0
i )−p0i ) where ρ > 0
is a free parameter that allows to trade off between the first
term, which makes the robot follow the local direction of the
track, and the second one, which keeps the robot close to the
center line.
D. Orientation control
Since the robots’ onboard cameras have a limited field of
view (see (7)), each robot needs to actively maintain visibility
of its opponent, despite both players motion, by exploiting the
yaw degree of freedom.
A simple, yet effective, strategy to maintain visibility is to
always align the camera axis to the relative bearing vector βij
thus maintaining the opponent in the center of the image.
Given the planned (respectively predicted) trajectory for
player i and its opponent, we can then calculate the desired
yaw angle for player i as
ψki = atan2(e
T
2 β
k
ij , e
T
1 β
k
ij),with β
k
ij =
pkj − pki∥∥pkj − pki ∥∥ .
A desired angular velocity can also be computed by differ-
entiating consecutive samples as ωki =
ψki −ψk−1i
δt .
VI. OPPONENT POSITION ESTIMATION
The proposed planning strategy requires each agent to
know both players positions (p01,p
0
2) at the beginning of each
planning phase. As already mentioned, we assume that each
robot knows its own position from onboard sensors. On the
other hand, because of the lack of communication between
the players, the position of the opponent must be estimated
by fusing the visual and inertial measurements from onboard
camera and IMU sensors. In our implementation, we first
exploit the onboard camera and gyro, to estimate the opponent
position expressed in the local body frame of robot i, i.e. pij .
Then, we transform the final estimate into the world reference
frame using the available ego state estimates.
The belief over the opponent’s relative state is maintained
via a Kalman Filter and the expected value of this belief is
used as the opponent’s state estimate in the final solution to
Problem (16).
1http://gamma.cs.unc.edu/RVO2/
In order to be robust with respect to altitude control errors
and robot roll and pitch rotations, for estimation purposes,
we consider a 3D dynamical model. We approximate the
relative dynamics of opponent j with respect to i as a second
order kinematic model. Assuming constant world-frame linear
velocities for both robots (i.e. v˙i = v˙j = 0), differentiating (6)
we obtain[
p˙ij
v˙ij
]
=
[−S(ωi) I3
03×3 −S(ωi)
] [
pij
vij
]
+w . (19)
In these dynamics, vij = RTi (vj − vi), S(ωi) is the skew
symmetric matrix built with the components of robot i’s body
frame rotation rates ωi —measured via gyroscope—and w ∼
N (06,Q) is additive, zero-mean Gaussian white noise with
covariance matrix Q ∈ R6×6.
As discussed below, robot i can measure the opponent’s
relative position using an onboard camera, i.e.
yi = pij + v , (20)
where yi ∈ R3, v ∼ N (03,R) is additive, zero-mean
Gaussian process noise with covariance matrix R ∈ R3×3.
Equations (19) and (20) form a time-varying linear system
with additive Gaussian input and measurement noise. Standard
Kalman filtering techniques can then be applied to design an
estimator.
We now detail the image processing pipeline that allows to
retrieve yi from the onboard camera images. As mentioned
in Sect. IV, each robot competing in the race is fitted with
a colored sphere of known (by both robots) color and radius
rs. The sphere center lies (approximately) on the vertical axis
of the robot so that its position in the world frame is not
affected by yaw rotations. The distance between the sphere
and the robot frame is also known. Finally, we assume that
the extrinsic and intrinsic camera parameters are calibrated for
each robot, the latter of which are modeled using the pinhole
camera model [33].
As discussed in [34], [35], the projection of the opponent’s
sphere on a player’s camera image plane is, in general, an
ellipse. If this latter can be segmented from the image, then
the 3D position of the sphere center with respect to the camera
can be directly expressed in terms of rs and a set of image
moments, up to the 2nd order, measured from the segmented
area.
In our implementation, the robots extract the colored blob
in the image frame via thresholding with the known color.
The most circular blob that is within a tracking window from
the previous blob’s location is used. The image moments of
the extracted blob are then calculated with OpenCV2 image
moment functions.
Using the known robot-to-sphere transformation and assum-
ing that the opponent is hovering, we can finally compute
the 3D position of the opponent, i.e. the filter measurement
in (20).
2https://opencv.org/
VII. RESULTS
A. Simulations
In order to validate our approach, we performed an exten-
sive simulation campaign. We used the open-source RotorS
package [36] to simulate the full quadrotor dynamics. To
avoid rendering the onboard camera images and speed up the
simulations, we did not make use of the vision-based tracking
and estimation algorithms described in Sect. VI. Instead, the
two robots have access to each other’s position, provided by
RotorS. Our planning algorithm was implemented in C++ and
interfaced with the simulator using ROS. We used a simulation
time step of 10 ms, but we run our planners at 20 Hz. We
also used state-of-the-art nonlinear controllers to drive our
quadrotors along the optimal trajectory resulting from the
solution of (16). We refer the reader to [37] and [38] for further
information about the control pipeline.
The two simulated robots have a radius of 0.3 m and
maintain a minimum relative distance d of 0.8 m from their
opponent. The simulated track is represented in Fig. 2. The
track fits into a 15 m × 11 m rectangle and its half-width wτ
is 1.5 m. The origin of the world frame was set at the center
of the longest straight segment of the track.
We let our game-theoretic planner and the alternative strate-
gies described in Sect. V-C compete against each other over
multiple races differing by the robots initial positions. In
order to enforce some interaction, we set the maximum linear
velocities of the two robots to 0.5 m/s and 0.6 m/s and we
made the faster robot always start behind the slower one. In
particular, for each race, we sampled the initial position of
the faster robot from a uniform distribution in the rectangle
[−0.1, 1.5]× [−0.7, 0.7]. Similarly, the position of the slower
robot was sampled from the rectangle [1.6, 1.7]× [−0.7, 0.7].
We discarded any pair of sampled initial positions that would
violate the collision avoidance constraints (5).
We ran a total of 900 simulations in which the same 150
sampled initial conditions were used for each of the following
scenarios:
case I: fast GTP vs. slow MPC;
case II: fast MPC vs. slow GTP;
case III: fast GTP vs. slow RVO;
case IV: fast RVO vs. slow GTP;
case V: fast MPC vs. slow RVO;
case VI: fast RVO vs. slow MPC.
Here, and in the rest of this section, the acronym GTP indicates
the Game Theoretic Planner developed in this paper. We
terminated each simulation as soon as one robot completed
an entire track loop and reached the finish line positioned at
x = 2.32 m.
In Fig. 4, we report an histogram representation of the final
distance along the track (i.e. the arch-length difference (8))
between the two robots. In cases I to IV, the distance is
calculated in such a way that it is positive when the robot
controlled using GTP wins the race and negative otherwise. In
cases V and VI, instead, a positive distance indicates a victory
for the MPC planner over RVO. A green and red coloring
is also used to highlight positive and negative parts of the
histogram.
(a) Case I: fast GTP vs. slow MPC (b) Case II: fast MPC vs. slow GTP
(c) Case III: fast GTP vs. slow RVO (d) Case IV: fast RVO vs. slow GTP
(e) Case V: fast MPC vs. slow RVO (f) Case VI: fast RVO vs. slow MPC
Figure 4: Histogram representation of the final arch-length
difference (as in (8)) between the two robots for all of the
simulations. The simulations are divided by case as indicated
in the captions. In (a) to (d), the distance is calculated in such
a way that it is positive when the robot controlled using GTP
wins the race and negative otherwise. In (e) and (f), instead,
a positive distance indicates a victory for the MPC planner
over RVO. A green and red coloring is also used to highlight
positive and negative parts of the histogram.
In Fig. 5, we report the position traces for the two competing
robots for all of the simulations. The traces are divided by case
and we used the following color code: GTP – green, MPC –
blue, RVO – red.
First of all, as it can be seen from Figs. 4c to 4f, the
RVO strategy is clearly the least effective one among the three
alternatives considered in this paper. Regardless of the initial
placing and of the possible advantage in terms of maximum
speed, the robots controlled with this strategy lost all races.
We believe that the main reason for this poor performance is
the fact that RVO is a reactive (instantaneous) control strategy
while both GTP and MPC use an extended planning horizon.
Because of the lack of planning, RVO does not anticipate
(and appropriately cut) the curves and ends up following a
longer trajectory. This can clearly be noticed by looking at
Figs. 5c to 5f. The performance could possibly be improved
by considering alternative heuristics in the calculation of the
reference/desired velocity for the RVO algorithm.
The comparison between GTP and MPC is somewhat more
fair because both strategies effectively follow the track and
the only difference between the two lies in the way they
interact with the opponent (the two algorithms are perfectly
identical when the two robots do not interact). A direct
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Figure 5: Position traces for the two competing robots for all
of the simulations. The simulations are divided by case as
indicated in the captions and the following color code was
used for the planners: GTP – green, MPC – blue, RVO – red.
comparison between the two strategies is provided by Figs. 4a
and 4b. From Fig. 4a, we can notice that, when the drone
running the GTP planner is faster than the MPC one, it
manages to overtake the MPC planner, which starts from an
advantageous position, in approximately 30% of the races. A
closer look at the simulations reveals that, in this scenario,
the GTP planner often tends to "overestimate" its opponent (it
assumes the opponent is using GTP as well). The consequence
of this is that, when attempting to overtake, it expects the
opponent to block its motion and ends up following an overly
cautions trajectory moving sideways along the track more than
necessary.
On the other hand, when the GTP is slower, it manages to
defend its initial advantage for the vast majority of the races
(see Fig. 4b). Looking at Fig. 5b, we can clearly visualize the
strategy adopted by the GTP planner to defend its position,
especially towards the end of the race (the bottom straight
part of the track). The GTP planner clearly moves sideways
along the track to block the MPC planner thus exploiting the
collision avoidance constraint to its own advantage. The MPC
planner, instead, cannot adopt a similar strategy because it
does not properly model the reactions of its opponent. On the
contrary, by assuming that the opponent will move straight
along the path, completely careless of possible collisions, the
MPC planner is often forced to make room to the opponent
because of its own collision avoidance constraints (see, for
example, the blue traces in the top right part of Fig. 5a).
An indirect comparison between GTP and MPC can also
be done by analyzing how they both perform against RVO in
similar situations. Both when competing against a slower robot
(see Figs. 4c and 4e) and against a faster one (see Figs. 4d
and 4f) the GTP planner tends to win with a slightly larger
separation in average and a much more narrow distribution
of final distances. The improvement is more significant when
the GTP is playing in a "defensive" role, i.e. it is controlling
a slower robot with an initial advantage. We believe that
this is due, once again, to an overly cautious behavior when
attempting to overtake the opponent in cases I and III.
B. Experiments
We also validated our approach by implementing and testing
it on real hardware.
Our quadrotors are based on the DJI F330 frame and
equipped with both off-the-shelf and custom-made compo-
nents. The robots have a take-off weight of approximately
900 g and a diagonal rotor distance of 33 cm.
A PX4FMU autopilot provides, among other sensors, an
Inertial Measurement Unit and a micro-controller running a
low-level controller for the robot orientation and bodyrates.
An Odroid single-board computer is used to run the algorithm
described in Sect. VI in order to estimate the state of the other
vehicle from images acquired by a forward-facing MatrixVi-
sion mvBlueFOX-MLC200w 752× 480-pixel RGB camera
with a framerate of 15 fps. The motion planner and the high-
level position controller, instead, were run on a ground-station
which communicates with the onboard Odroids through Wi-
Fi. Actuation is provided by four T-MOTOR MT2208 motors,
controlled by Dys XSD 20A speed controllers.
In addition to the onboard sensors, each robot is also
provided, through wireless communication, with ego pose
measurements from an Optitrack motion-capture system. This
information is fused onboard with inertial measurements in an
Extended Kalman Filter [39] to estimate the full robot state.
In our experiment, both robots were running the game-
theoretic planner described in this paper. They both had a
maximum speed limitation of 0.6 m/s and assumed 0.3 m/s
limitation for their opponent. The minimum allowed distance
between the two was 0.6 m. The experimental track center
line was a square of 2.3 m sides with rounded corners and a
half-width wτ of 0.9 m.
Some snapshots of the experiment are reported in Fig. 6 but
we highly encourage the reader to visualize the attached video
(also available at https://youtu.be/cJW1RysDKDg) to better
appreciate the robots behavior. In the snapshots (as well as
in the video) we used solid red and blue lines to represent the
trajectory currently planned by each robot and dashed lines
of opposite colors for the trajectory predicted, for the same
robot, by the adversary.
As it can be noticed by the video, our experimental space
is not sufficiently large for the robots to overtake each other
given their size and the track width. However, one can still
appreciate how each robot continuously replans its own and
its opponent trajectory as well as the interactions that each
player predicts for the future. In particular, one can notice
that the red robot mostly follows the track without expecting
to have any interaction with its opponent (which it assumes to
be slower). On the contrary, the blue robot plans to overtake
the adversary and, in some cases, it expects this latter to block
it by moving sideways (see, for example, the blue lines in the
third snapshot). The video also demonstrates, in the bottom,
the performance of our vision-based tracking and estimation
algorithms discussed in Sect. VI.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we described a novel online motion planning
algorithm for two-player drone racing. By exploiting sensi-
tivity analysis within an iterated best response algorithm, our
planner can effectively model and even exploit the opponent’s
reactions.
From a theoretical point of view, we showed that, if the
iterative resolution strategy converges to a solution, then this
latter satisfies necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, we demonstrated the effectiveness of our approach
through an extensive set of simulations in which our planner
was let to compete against two alternative, and well estab-
lished, approaches. Finally, we also presented a vision-based
tracking and estimation algorithm that can efficiently estimate
the opponent’s pose.
Both our planner and our estimation strategies can run in
real time and their performance was demonstrated through
experimental tests on real hardware.
Despite the encouraging results, our planner still presents
some weakness. First of all, because of the non-convexity of
our problem, the optimization algorithm can converge to local
minima. In the future, we want to investigate the use of mixed
integer approaches to better handle the non-convex constraints
of our problem. In addition to this, our planner assumes
that the opponent is using a similar planning strategy with a
known cost function. On the one hand, our algorithm showed
very good performance when competing against alternative
strategies (which clearly violate this assumption). On the other
hand, we noticed that, in certain situations, our planner can
"overestimate" the intelligence of the adversary and generate
overly conservative trajectories. In this respect, it would be
interesting to couple our strategy with an online approach for
learning the opponent policy and/or cost function. We also
plan to extend our results to races involving more than two
players.
Finally, we believe that similar game theoretic approaches
would prove successful in a number of applications, particu-
larly in autonomous driving scenarios involving multiple cars
and/or pedestrians.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
In order to simplify the notation as much as possible, in this
subsection we consider a streamlined form for the optimization
problem of the form
max
x
s(x)
s.t. γ(x, c) = 0
(21)
where c is a scalar parameter and s and γ are scalar dif-
ferentiable functions of their arguments. For each value of
c, let us indicate with x∗(c) the solution of (21) and with
s∗(c) = s(x∗(c)) the associated optimal outcome. We want to
study how the optimal cost s∗ changes when c changes around
a point c, i.e.
ds∗(c)
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
=
ds(x∗(c))
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
=
ds(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x∗(c)
dx∗(c)
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
(22)
Since, for all c, x∗(c) is an optimal solution to (21), it must
satisfy the KKT necessary optimality conditions associated
to (21), i.e.
ds(x)
dx
∣∣∣∣
x∗
− µ ∂γ(x, c)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗
= 0 (23)
γ(x∗(c), c) = γ∗(c) = 0 (24)
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the equality
constraint. Isolating the first term in (23) and substituting it
in (22) we obtain
ds∗(c)
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
= µ
∂γ(x, c)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗(c)
dx∗(c)
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
. (25)
Note that, since (24) must remain true for all c, its total
derivative w.r.t. c must also be zero, i.e.
dγ∗(c)
dc
=
∂γ(x, c)
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x∗
dx∗(c)
dc
+
∂γ(x, c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
x∗
= 0. (26)
Isolating the first term from (26) and substituting it in (25),
we finally conclude that
ds∗(c)
dc
∣∣∣∣
c
= −µ ∂γ(x, c)
∂c
∣∣∣∣
x∗(c)
,
which reduces to (14) for x = θj , c = θl−1i , and x
∗ = θlj .
This proof can trivially be extended to problems with
multiple joint constraints or with additional constraints that
do not depend on c (their derivatives with respect to c will
simply be null). If the problem contains inequality constraints,
instead, under the assumption that, in the vicinity of c, the set
of active constraints remains the same, the proof can readily
be applied by just considering an equivalent problem in which
any active inequality constraint is transformed into an equality
constraints and any inactive constraint is ignored.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to (10) one ob-
tains the following set of necessary conditions for a Nash
Figure 6: Snapshots of the real hardware experiments using our game-theoretic planner for two-player drone racing. The top
row shows two external views of the experiment. Solid thick lines indicate the current trajectory planned by each robot for
itself. Dashed thinner line of the same color indicate the predicted opponent trajectory. The bottom row shows images from the
robots’ onboard cameras with an overlay of the visual tracking results. We highly encourage the reader to view the attached
video, which is also available at https://youtu.be/cJW1RysDKDg.
equilibrium (θ∗1,θ
∗
2) and the associated Lagrange multipliers
∂si
∂θi
(θ∗i )− µ∗i
∂γi
∂θi
(θ∗i ,θ
∗
j ) (27a)
− λ∗i
∂hi
∂θi
(θ∗i )− ν∗i
∂gi
∂θi
(θ∗i ) = 0
hi(θ
∗
i ) = 0 (27b)
gi(θ
∗
i ) ≤ 0 (27c)
ν∗i gi(θ
∗
i ) = 0,ν
∗
i ≥ 0 (27d)
γi(θ
∗
i ,θ
∗
j ) ≤ 0 (27e)
µ∗iγi(θ
∗
i ,θ
∗
j ) = 0,µ
∗
i ≥ 0 (27f)
Now assume that the iterative algorithm described in Sect. V
converges to a solution (θl1,θ
l
2), i.e. θ
l+1
i = θ
l
i for both play-
ers. Then, by applying the KKT conditions to problem (15),
(θl1,θ
l
2) must satisfy
∂si
∂θi
(θli) + αiµ
l
j
∂γj
∂θi
(θli,θ
l
j)− µli
∂γi
∂θi
(θli,θ
l
j) (28a)
λli
∂hi
∂θi
(θli)− νli
∂gi
∂θi
(θli) = 0
hi(θ
l
i) = 0 (28b)
gi(θ
l
i) ≤ 0 (28c)
νligi(θ
l
i) = 0,ν
l
i ≥ 0 (28d)
γi(θ
l
i,θ
l
j) ≤ 0 (28e)
µliγi(θ
l
i,θ
l
j) = 0,µ
l
i ≥ 0 (28f)
If one additionally has ∂γi∂θi (θ
l
i,θ
l
j) =
∂γj
∂θi
(θli,θ
l
j) (as it is
the case for our problem), then one can see that (θl1,θ
l
2) satisfy
(27a) to (27e) with λ∗i = λ
l
i,ν
∗
i = ν
l
i and µ
∗
i = µ
l
i − αiµlj .
In order to satisfy (27f), however, one also needs to impose
that:
(µl1 − α1µl2)γ1(θl1,θl2) = 0 (29a)
µl1 ≥ α1µl2 (29b)
(µl2 − α2µl1)γ2(θl1,θl2) = 0 (29c)
µl2 ≥ α2µl1. (29d)
Using (28f), (29a) and (29c) reduce to
α1µ
l
2γ1(θ
l
1,θ
l
2) = 0
α2µ
l
1γ2(θ
l
1,θ
l
2) = 0.
Exploiting, again, (28f), this condition is satisfied if
γ1(θ
l
1,θ
l
2) = γ2(θ
l
1,θ
l
2) for all active constraints and if
the sets of active constraints are the same for both players
(i.e. µl1 > 0 ⇐⇒ µl2 > 0). Both these conditions are
satisfied if, as it is the case for our application, γ1(θ
l
1,θ
l
2) =
γ2(θ
l
1,θ
l
2). As for (29b) and (29d), instead, if γi(θi,θj) =
γj(θi,θj), one can enforce it by making αi arbitrarily small.
C. Proof of (18)
Consider the following optimization problem:
min
s
d(s,pNi ).
We can interpret pNi as a constant parameter and study how the
solution si to the above problem changes when pNi changes
around a point pNi . Under the optimality assumption, for each
value pNi , the corresponding solution si(p
N
i ) must satisfy the
following necessary condition
∂d(s,pNi )
∂s
∣∣∣∣
si(pNi )
= 0. (31)
Note that the left hand side of (31) is a function of pNi only
and it must be zero for all pNi . Therefore, its derivative with
respect to pNi must also be zero
0 =
d
dpNi
[
∂d(s,pNi )
∂s
∣∣∣∣
si(pNi )
]
=
∂2d(s,pNi )
∂s2
∣∣∣∣
si(pNi )
dsi(pNi )
dpNi
+
∂2d(s,pNi )
∂s∂pNi
.
We can, then, conclude that:
dsi(pNi )
dpNi
= −
[
∂2d(s,pNi )
∂s2
∣∣∣∣
si(pNi )
]−1
∂2d(s,pNi )
∂s∂pNi
q.e.d.
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